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A Fundamental Truth About 
Developmental Disorders
A big turning point in my research was the realization 
that the developmental disorders I studied, autism and 
dyslexia, are lifelong conditions and should also be stud-
ied in adults. Twenty-five years ago, it was odd to see a 
developmental psychologist recruit dyslexic and autistic 
adults as participants in experiments. There were no 
diagnostic instruments for adults at that time. Now that 
we have these instruments, some deeper truths have 
emerged: First, diagnosis based on behavioral criteria will 
always be problematic, as behavior is strongly influenced 
by comorbidity, motivation, age, and ability. Second, 
compensatory learning can circumvent or cover up, but 
not eliminate, some basic difficulties in cognitive pro-
cessing. Third, comorbidity and low general ability tend 
to reduce opportunities for compensation.
Twenty-five years ago, it became apparent that many 
dyslexic adults had learned to read accurately and could 
achieve an acceptable reading age. Later, it also became 
apparent that, in Italy, dyslexic children read perfectly 
accurately. This success is due to the transparent and 
regular Italian writing system, which I have suggested 
can act as a therapeutic environment for dyslexia 
(U. Frith, 1999). However, we were able to demonstrate 
the presence of dyslexia in Italy and the persistence of 
reading problems in dyslexic adults using measures of 
reading speed and tests designed to tap phonological 
processing. These measures revealed underlying neuro-
cognitive problems, indicating that they are universal, 
regardless of language, and persistent, regardless of com-
pensatory learning (Paulesu et al., 2001).
In the case of autism, the huge range of clinical mani-
festations is a major problem. This can be observed not 
only by comparing different individuals, but also by trac-
ing changes during the lifetime of a single individual. 
Thus, since the 1980s, it has been known that some indi-
viduals start off being aloof and withdrawn and later 
become socially active but odd. Repetitive behaviors 
often lessen with age; special interests can vanish and 
savant talents can change. It is still not clear what causes 
these changes and wide variations, but comorbidity 
increases severity whereas compensation makes it possi-
ble to disguise persisting problems (U. Frith, 2008).
Adults with dyslexia and adults with autism who show 
good compensation can sail through standard diagnostic 
tests. Have they ceased to be dyslexic or autistic? Of 
course not. They themselves tell us about their persisting 
problems, and we can reveal these problems with more 
subtle tests. We now know that dyslexics read well at a 
cost of time and effort. The same is true for autistic peo-
ple. They can use well-rehearsed social scripts that work 
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in familiar situations. However, stress and unfamiliar situ-
ations can produce catastrophic collapse. To visualize the 
differences between surface behavior and underlying 
cognitive mechanisms, I have found it useful to apply a 
framework representing three levels of explanation: 
behavior, cognition, and brain (U. Frith, 2001). These do 
not map onto each other in one-to-one fashion. Rather, a 
large number of biological risk factors may lead to diffi-
culties in a few specific cognitive processes. These few 
difficulties in turn may give rise to a large number of 
behavioral signs and symptoms (U. Frith, 2012).
A Fundamental Change in Methods: 
Looking Inside the Brain/Mind
It is a little known fact that the development of diagnostic 
tests for adults gained impetus from the desire to make 
use of the emerging neuroimaging techniques. This 
advance occurred because it seemed wrong to scan chil-
dren. In fact, when we scanned the first dyslexic adults in 
the mid 1990s, we had known them from when they had 
been first diagnosed as children. The same was true for 
the first autistic adults. The diagnostic tests now available 
have been a great boon in many ways, but especially for 
those people who had slipped through the net and were 
not diagnosed as children. They had unjustly been 
labeled slow, lazy, or unintelligent. Having a name for 
your problems and learning that there are others like you 
can be liberating.
It is remarkable how quickly research on disorders of 
cognitive development has transformed into cognitive 
developmental neuroscience. This advance was due to 
the generous collaboration of researchers who pioneered 
neuroimaging methods and volunteers who braved the 
still novel scanners. In those heady days, we naively 
hoped that we would be able to immediately identify the 
malfunctioning brain circuit that gave rise to critical dif-
ficulties in cognitive processing, such as difficulty in pho-
nological processing in dyslexia or difficulty in social 
processing in autism. Things turned out to be far more 
complex, particularly as we are still largely ignorant of 
how the brain works. Which brain circuits are necessary 
for distinct cognitive processing mechanisms? How do 
they function in neurotypical brains? We had, and still 
have, a lot to learn.
Today, when researchers have reassured themselves 
that MRI methods are safe also for children, the field is 
changing again. There are now several longitudinal stud-
ies in progress in which individuals are scanned repeat-
edly over many years. This work is giving us information 
about the developing brain and mind that we simply 
never had before. For instance, there is a dramatic wax-
ing and waning restructuring of gray and white matter 
throughout childhood and adolescence. This work should 
get us closer to understand which cognitive processes 
might go wrong in neurodevelopmental disorders and 
when.
The Rise and Fall of Asperger 
Syndrome
Autism has always been with us, but it has been recog-
nized only since the mid 20th century, and then only very 
slowly. The prevalence is now thought to be around 1%, 
which is a staggering increase from the 0.1% estimate 
from 25 years ago. One major reason for the increase is 
the widening of the diagnostic criteria (U. Frith, 2008)—
the spectrum of autism is now incredibly broad. At one 
extreme is the individual who does not use speech and 
has severely repetitive and restricted behaviors; at the 
other extreme is the individual with Asperger syndrome 
who is highly articulate and has superior analytic abilities 
and fascinating special interests. Despite these differ-
ences, there is a common denominator: a highly recog-
nizable lack of reciprocal social interaction. Even the 
very able individual on the milder part of the autism 
spectrum cannot compensate for a peculiar void in social 
interaction: engaging in the ordinary to and fro of every-
day human communication (Frith, 2004).
The widespread public recognition of Asperger syn-
drome was impossible to foresee when I translated 
Asperger’s landmark paper (U. Frith, 1991) at a time 
when most people had never heard of the name. But the 
rise over the last 20 years may now be followed by a 
fall—the fifth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders has abandoned the label. It 
was removed because it is widely agreed that the critical 
features distinguishing Asperger syndrome from other 
neurodevelopmental disorders are the same as those 
seen in autism. In addition, there is a largely unrecog-
nized downside to the rise of Asperger syndrome: 
Researchers have become less interested in studying 
those who are intellectually disabled. These individuals 
are much more difficult to study. Yet they have so much 
to tell us, if we only knew the right questions to ask.
Mechanisms of Social Cognition
Autism provided the inspiration for the idea that social 
information might be processed differently from other 
information and given priority in neurotypical minds 
(U. Frith & Frith, 1999). Of course, we still don’t know 
what the processes are like and how the prioritizing 
works. Autism throws the spotlight on social communica-
tion, and furthermore, it reverses the tables: What is 
it that makes us insatiable in our craving for social 
communication?
Many different mechanisms in our mind are dedicated 
to processing social stimuli (C. Frith & Frith, 2012). One 
of these, known as Theory of Mind, or mentalizing, 
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entered psychologist’s jargon as shorthand for the ten-
dency to attribute mental states to each other. Amazingly, 
this tendency has a circumscribed basis in the brain 
(U. Frith & Frith, 1999) and has been operationalized by 
tasks such as the Sally-Ann test. In this test, children 
above the age of 4 can attribute a false belief to Sally, but 
autistic children cannot do so. However, it turned out that 
this is not the whole story—able autistic adolescents and 
adults can pass the Sally-Ann test and similar tasks.
There is also a nonverbal type of intuitive mentalizing, 
which can be assessed via eye gaze patterns, and here 
we get a different story: Even young infants engage in 
this intuitive mentalizing, but able autistic adults do not 
(Senju, Southgate, White, & Frith, 2009). Perhaps this is 
why they struggle with everyday fast moving reciprocal 
communication even when they have learned to attribute 
mental states explicitly (U. Frith, 2012). Many questions 
are now being raised about mentalizing and its likely 
presence in other species, such as birds and dolphins. 
What is uniquely human in social communication? Why 
have only humans invented governments and schools, 
and how do they manage their reputation in the age of 
the World Wide Web (Tennie, Frith, & Frith, 2010)? So 
much remains to be explored in the next 25 years.
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